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CLIMATE	CHANGE	AND	ETHICS	
	
	
	
	
What does it matter if the climate changes?  This kind of question does not admit of a 
scientific answer.  Natural science can tell us what some of its biophysical effects are likely to 
be; social scientists can estimate what consequences such effects could have for human lives 
and livelihoods.  But how should we respond?  The question is at root about how we think we 
should live – and different people have myriad different ideas about this.  The distinctive task 
of ethics is to bring some clarity and order to these ideas. 
 
 
 
Climate change is a matter of concern because, according to various prognoses offered by 
scientists, its effects are likely to be detrimental to human – and not only human – life on this 
planet: ‘human beings are transforming Earth in ways that are devastating for other forms of 
life, future human beings, and many of our human contemporaries.’1  Given that premise, the 
central role of ethics is to organise thought about what humans ought to do in response to the 
threats they face, and to some extent are creating.    
People engage practically in ethics whenever they make or assess particular 
proposals about what should be done; but a task focused on more by academic specialists is 
that of clarifying the structure of moral considerations that are brought to bear on a problem, 
along with elucidating the assumptions being borne upon.  In practice and in theory, then, 
ethics reflects on the human goods that climate change can undermine, and examines 
questions such as what actions are right or wrong in relation to climate change, who has what 
duties, and how do these relate to others’ rights, e.g., to be protected against effects of 
climate change?  The relevant range of problems has come into focus only relatively recently, 
with most literature appearing during the last 20 years or so, but with considerable 
acceleration since the time Gardiner’s seminal review appearing in 2004,2 and as witnessed 
by two noteworthy collections of influential articles appearing in 2011.3 4   
In what follows, I show, first, how the greater part of debate about the ethics of 
climate change focuses on questions about who has what responsibility to bear the burdens 
of mitigating it or adapting to it.  These questions are frequently in practice inflected in the 
language of rights, and the various connections between human rights and climate change 
are examined next.  If some questions concern justice in the present, others regard our 
responsibilities to the future, as examined in the third section.  The fourth main area of inquiry 
concerns the relation between individual and collective responsibilities. 
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Responsibilities   
If humankind were a unitary agent, it could pursue clear objectives for reducing or capturing 
carbon emissions, where necessary also implementing measures for assisting those of the 
human body having to adapt to consequences of climate change. However, humankind is not 
a unitary agent.  So a prominent debate in climate ethics concerns who has a responsibility to 
do what. The ‘what’ is usually discussed under two headings: mitigation and adaptation. 
Ethical evaluation can apply both to the decisions that cause climate change and to the 
effects it has.  Some philosophers emphasize the distinction between the two kinds of 
responsibility,5 and there are those who focus attention primarily on mitigation6 or adaptation;7 
but there are also reasons to think an integrated theory appropriate.8  
Where debate has been more intense is on the question of the who – who has a 
responsibility to shoulder the burdens.  Regarding the range of potential bearers of it – which 
could be individuals, corporations, states, for instance – to date, the allocation of 
responsibilities has focused in practice at the level of nation-states, and there has been 
international agreement to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities among 
them.9  The general assumption has remained that, as Grubb noted in 1995, the main 
question is justice of allocation of emissions as between states.10 This assumption is not 
without its critics,11 but the relevance of focusing on states is that they still have main political 
decision making powers in the world today. 
Most attention has focused on the criteria for differentiation of responsibilities. 
Because responsibilities imply costs or burdens to be borne, and since people have a general 
preference to shift these whenever possible onto others, there is the most argument here.  
The issues involved have been brought into particular focus in connection with debate around 
international climate change agreements.  The Kyoto Protocol adopted the so-called 
‘Grandfathering Principle’: the developed – Annex-I – countries were required to reduce 
emissions by an average of 5 percent compared to 1990 levels.  Hence those already heavily 
polluting in 1990 could continue emitting more GHGs than lower emitting countries.  In post-
Kyoto negotiations, which envisage developing countries also being included in the emissions 
reduction programme, the richer countries continue to press for application of the principle.12  
Philosophers assessing the principle’s rationale, however, have generally regarded it as a 
pragmatic accommodation rather than a moral argument:13 if it is the only politically feasible 
way to get major polluters to accept emissions reductions, it is better than foregoing 
agreement altogether.14  Recent attempts to tease out what more, morally, might be said for it 
have not claimed to defeat the main ethical objections.15  These include concerns that the 
grandfathering of emissions rights will entrench existing inequalities by preventing those who 
are worse off from having the same opportunities and life chances had by affluent citizens of 
heavier polluting countries;16 and it would effectively prevent less economically developed 
countries from tackling energy poverty, thereby locking them into a state of 
underdevelopment.17   
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Differentiating common responsibilities: who should bear the costs of dealing with 
climate change? 
 
Principles Differentiation criteria Pros Cons 
Causal 
Responsibility 
Principle 
(Polluter Pays) 
Those who have caused 
the build-up of CO2 in 
the atmosphere should 
bear the costs 
it seems fair that those 
who cause a problem 
should deal with it; 
 
those who emitted in the 
past may not have 
realized they were doing 
anything wrong, and now 
they are anyway dead, so 
while requiring future 
polluters to pay may be 
fair, we cannot impose 
costs on past polluters. 
Beneficiary 
Pays Principle 
Those who have 
benefited from excess 
emissions should pay 
 
this principle maintains 
connection with causal 
responsibility by allowing 
that past polluters can 
be deemed to have 
bequeathed liabilities to 
those who have been 
advantaged today by 
past emissions 
because it assumes that 
strict liability can apply 
retrospectively and can 
be inherited, present 
beneficiaries can 
complain it is unfair on 
them. 
Ability to Pay 
Principle 
Those who are able to 
should pay 
 
recognizes that past 
emissions may not have 
yielded present benefits 
for a given country and 
places costs on those 
least harmed by having 
to bear them 
disconnecting 
responsibility from 
causation can have 
perverse incentives if 
ecologically efficient are 
effectively required to 
subsidise polluters. 
 
 A stronger ethical argument can be made for the principle, found intuitively 
persuasive by many, that those who have been causally responsible for overburdening the 
atmosphere have moral responsibility for dealing with the consequences.  Nevertheless, there 
are considerations of both justice and practicability that tell against the principle that moral 
responsibility should track causal responsibility.  One regards the difference between applying 
it to present or future actions as opposed to applying it retrospectively.  Retrospective 
application of the principle can be challenged on the general grounds that this is 
presumptively illegitimate for any principle.18  More particularly, the Polluter Pays Principle – 
which is a specific application of causal responsibility (and sometimes misleadingly conflated 
with it) – is normally not deployed as a principle of historical accountability but as a practical 
device for ‘internalising’ the externalised environmental ‘costs’ of economic activities.19  So 
understood, it is a future-orientated principle that allows rational decision-making about the 
acceptability of costs in advance of incurring them.  The imputation of obligations and costs 
retrospectively, which is anyway questionable ethically and legally, is the more so if the 
emitters of previous generations were ignorant of the detrimental consequences of their 
actions.20 Furthermore, there is the evident practicality that principles of liability cannot apply 
to members of deceased generations themselves. Thus some people argue that the causal 
responsibility principle can be amended so that if we inherit assets from our grandfathers, 
then we should also be prepared to accept any liabilities that are attendant on those assets. 
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Simon Caney suggests that to adopt this stance is not to amend but to abandon the causal 
responsibility principle;21 it is certainly to take a distinct position. 
 This line of reasoning supports a second principle discussed in the climate justice 
literature, the ‘Beneficiary Pays Principle’: those who enjoy benefits generated by past 
activities which also cause harms to others have responsibility to shoulder a burden of 
alleviating those harms.22  On an approach sometimes referred to as ‘the Brazilian Proposal’ 
in Kyoto discussions, we should take account of countries’ historical emissions because 
countries that have polluted heavily have benefited considerably therefrom in terms of 
increased wealth and more developed infrastructure.23 Such countries have an ‘ecological 
debt’ to repay.24  
 One objection, noted by Caney, is that it is ‘unfair to hold current members of more 
affluent nations responsible for over-use of the atmospheric commons by their predecessors 
when there is little that they could have done to alter the energy choices of their ancestors.’25  
Others, however, point to the many advantages those living in developed countries enjoy over 
their counterparts in developing countries today  as a result of their nations’ historical 
emissions.26 Neumayer suggests that ‘the current developed countries readily accept the 
benefits from past emissions in the form of their high standard of living and should therefore 
not be exempted from being held accountable for the detrimental side-effects with which their 
living standards were achieved.’27 
 Another objection, though, is that some of the benefits of past emissions are not 
confined to the emitting countries. Grubb et al, for example, argue that past emissions made 
possible the development of public goods such as modern medicine or better technologies 
that have also raised living standards in developing countries.28  But Shue’s rejoinder is that 
whatever benefits less developed countries have received, these have mostly been charged 
for, the recipients being ‘left with an enormous burden of debt, much of it incurred precisely in 
the effort to purchase the good things produced by industrialization.’29  Finally, another 
possibility is that past emissions may not have yielded appreciable benefits to the present 
generation at all, but here Smith’s suggestion of applying thresholds of ability to pay30 seems 
a sensible solution. 
 In fact, one further principle frequently invoked in the climate justice literature is that 
those with the ability to pay should shoulder the burden.  This has pragmatic advantages over 
the previous two in that it does not require investigations of causality, or other problematic 
historical considerations. It is not usually commended as a sole or primary principle for 
allocating responsibilities, however, since that could support injustice or perverse incentives 
in cases where an ability to pay has been achieved through particular efficiency or ecological 
frugality.  But it is arguably appropriate to apply where the other principles fail or cannot 
apply.31 
In any debate about distributing responsibilities, to define them is also to delimit them, 
and the flipside of the question concerns the rights that people have.  For instance, 
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determining a responsibility not to emit more than a certain amount of CO2 is, in effect, to 
license emissions up to that amount, and it is this amount that negotiators want to know about 
in practice. 
	
Debates about rights  
The language of rights has figured prominently in climate ethics debates. In particular, there is 
debate about whether climate change can be regarded as a human rights issue, and if so 
how.32  Two prominent lines of argument can be distinguished: one treats the use of the 
planet’s carbon absorption capacity as a necessary good that humans have a right to share; 
the other focuses on how harms to the planet’s capacities can undermine goods that humans 
have a right to protection of. 
 The idea that there is a human right to a certain amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
has emerged with the idea that an appropriate benchmark for international agreements 
should be an equal per capita entitlement.  Some have argued that there is an entitlement to 
equal or minimum emissions,33 and the idea of a human right to ‘subsistence emissions’ has 
been influential in debates about the ethics of climate change since it was first proposed by 
Henry Shue, albeit then in the different context of ozone emissions. 34  Other philosophers, 
however, have entered skeptical considerations.  As David Miller says: ‘People have human 
rights to whatever is necessary to meet their basic needs as human beings, but they cannot 
claim a right to whatever means they themselves prefer to use to meet those needs.’35  And 
as I have elsewhere argued, carbon emissions should not be the object of a human right 
because a decent human life does not inherently depend on them: subsistence needs can be 
(and for much of human history have been) met without fossil-fuelled economic 
development.36  A right to minimum emissions risks exacerbating rather than resolving the 
problem of excessive emissions.  What the rich owe to the poor should be seen not as ‘more 
emissions’ but as an equitable share of the benefits they have derived from their own excess 
use of the atmosphere – and, indeed, other environmental services and natural resources, or 
‘ecological space’.37 
A different way in which human rights are brought into climate ethics debates is 
through a focus on how the harms brought about through climate change can have an 
adverse impact on the interests that human rights are intended to protect.  Derek Bell makes 
the striking claim that ‘anthropogenic climate change violates human rights’;38 Caney offers 
the more circumspect argument that there is a human right ‘not to be exposed to dangerous 
climate change’.39  However, these arguments are not always as clear as they might be on 
the relationship between interests and rights: not all philosophers agree that rights 
necessarily protect people’s interests;40 and, even allowing that they can do so, the mere 
existence of an interest is not itself sufficient for there to be a right.  For the positing of a right 
to be meaningful, it must imply that there is some duty on someone to bring about the 
outcome specified as the content of the right.41  Certainly, to speak of a right being violated 
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implies a strong claim that someone is doing something direct and pernicious.  Yet the reality 
is that responsibility is more diffused and complex.42 
Nevertheless, this general issue also affects rights other than those relating to climate 
change, and still the human rights discourse has real traction.  Recent years have seen 
developments towards international recognition of environmental human rights;43 with 
procedural rights having the firmest footing,44 but with growing acknowledgement too of an 
underlying substantive right to an adequate environment.45  Vanderheiden has suggested that 
as a corollary such a right includes a claim to climatic stability;(6) Hiskes argues that 
environmental human rights can serve as the basis for intergenerational environmental 
justice.46  Yet while the impetus to use human rights discourse and instruments has a clear 
motivation, there remain issues and uncertainties around using human rights for 
environmental ends or the pursuit of environmental justice.47  Those difficulties are all the 
more marked when we think about climate change having future effects. 
 
Ethics for the Future 
Although we now take a view of climate change as having effects already in the present, the 
future horizon remains a major focus of concern, with questions about justice between 
generations and our obligations to future generations looming large.48 
Concerns about climate change are premised on the idea that there is something 
wrong in allowing the environment to deteriorate for future generations of humans.  Yet when 
we think more closely what this might mean we encounter certain conundrums.  One much 
discussed in the climate change literature is the notorious ‘non-identity problem’ formulated 
by Derek Parfit.49  The puzzle is that if an act is wrong, this is because it harms future persons 
or makes things worse for them than otherwise they’d have been; but a person’s identity 
depends on the time at which he or she is conceived; and different patterns of behaviour in 
this generation will result in different individuals being born into future generations; therefore 
we cannot be said to have harmed, or made worse off, any future person through climate 
change damage by a policy without which they would not have existed at all.50  While some 
philosophers attempt to finds ways of dealing with this conundrum,51 others doubt that it really 
captures what we need to be concerned about, particularly if a less individualistic framing of 
the problem is adopted.52  Yet the broader point remains that some indeterminacy is always 
likely to affect our thinking about the ethical claims on us of future generations.  For instance, 
if we think about assigning rights to future generations, and non-individualistically, we face the 
difficulty that it is not straightforward to speak of groups having rights even in the present, and 
it is problematic to speak of rights of beings who do not even exist yet.  Nor are such 
difficulties surmounted by speaking instead of our duties regarding them, since the same 
sorts of questions arise. 
Nevertheless, we are accustomed to the idea that although much about the future is 
uncertain, we still have to make decisions now.  There is a very basic, and quite simple 
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principle articulated by proponents of a stewardship approach to environmental ethics that we 
should treat the world as if held by us in trust, which means leaving it in no worse condition 
for future generations than we find it.53 This principle is reflected in the concept, influential 
since the Brundtland Report 25 years ago, of sustainable development: ‘development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.’ 54  This concept has met little resistance, even if questions like why take 
‘now’ as the baseline for future generations when past generations did not always inherit as 
much as we did have been voiced.55  But it is notoriously susceptible of different 
interpretations.56  One major area of debate in environmental values has always focused on 
the question of how much of nature’s ‘capital’ can be substituted by manufactured goods or 
other kinds of technological capacity, with the concept of ‘strong’ sustainability allowing much 
less substitution than ‘weak’ sustainability.57  Depending on the interpretation adopted, the 
difference in the degree of constraint implied for economic ‘business-as-usual’ is very 
considerable.  The weaker the constraints are taken to be, the more latitude there is for 
thinking that humankind will be able to develop its way out of environmental problems, 
through the application of innovation and technology.  The latitude of this conception is 
consistent with economists’ assumptions about the possibility of economic growth continuing 
indefinitely into the future. 
Much of the debate about what to do regarding climate change relates to economic 
considerations, but its terms are not ethically neutral. Often it is framed in terms of a 
perceived trade-off between economic benefits and environmental costs.  But a case can also 
be made for the positive economic value of tackling climate change. This follows in a tradition 
of environmental economics that seeks to attach value or price to unpriced or undervalued 
environmental ‘services’.58  The influential report prepared by the British economist Nicholas 
Stern is a noteworthy case. Specifically regarding the future dimension, Stern gave serious 
attention to the ethical issues involved in the choice of the discount rate – that is to say, the 
rate at which the value of assets and welfare, as well as costs and economic damages, 
including as a result of climate change, is assumed to diminish over time, from the standpoint 
of the present.  Stern arrived at a significantly lower rate of discount in determining the current 
‘correct’ price for carbon emissions than the influential position of William Nordhaus: the 
overall social discount rate employed by Stern was only 1.4% compared to Nordhaus’s 
5.5%.59  This led Stern to support immediate emissions reductions consistent with a USD300 
per tonne tax on carbon emissions. By contrast Nordhaus supports a carbon tax of only 
around USD30 per tonne, rising to USD85 per tonne by 2050.  This difference is almost 
entirely the result of the different assumptions made when calculating the social discount 
rate.60  The high rate implies a very low level of concern for our descendents.61  So the 
economics of climate change cannot be separated out from the ethics: it implicitly relies on 
ethical judgments regarding the nature of our obligations regarding future generations.62   
Stern himself has been criticized from both sides about the assumptions he allows.  
Not only the more conservative mainstream economists but also more radical thinkers63 have 
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identified a politically-loaded vision of a tamed capitalism – not unrestrained, but not seriously 
challenged – persisting indefinitely into the future.  A similar vision seems to be assumed also 
by liberal political theorists who suggest that an appropriate approach to our future orientated 
obligations is to adopt John Rawls’s idea of a ‘just savings principle’,64 although it is 
questionable what exactly we can be saving for the future if we are already overusing the 
planet’s resources and environmental capacities.65 
 
Taking decisions regarding the future 
 
How to act against climate change cannot be decided on the basis of ‘hard numbers’ because 
there are no ‘hard numbers’ when it comes to climate change. To outsiders, the cost-benefit 
analyses (CBA) of economists may suggest otherwise. But those who understand what the studies 
do, also know two things. First, many effects of climate change simply cannot be adequately 
monetarily valued. Second, what can be valued needs to be transformed from values in the distant 
future to present values and any CBA recommendation is therefore crucially dependent on the 
discount rate used, and there is no such thing as the “right” discount rate, for the rate chosen is in 
turn inextricably linked to normative value judgements. It follows that, one way or the other, the 
decision-making toward climate change is heavily influenced by ethical choices.  
 
[Adapted from Neumayer66] 
 
 
The nature and shape of the ethical problem facing us becomes quite different if, 
instead of anticipating a context of gradual environmental deterioration and incremental 
hardships as a likely result, we anticipate dramatic and catastrophic changes.67  With the 
prospect of runaway climate change precipitated by passing various “tipping points” of abrupt 
change, questions arise, in particular, of whether and when a precautionary approach ought 
to be adopted by policy-makers.  The Precautionary Principle has neither a commonly 
accepted definition nor a set of criteria to guide its implementation,68 but attempts to elicit a 
core idea for it have been made in debates about precaution relation to climate change.69  
The general idea is that If there is a potential for harm from an activity, and uncertainty about 
the magnitude of impacts or causality, then anticipatory action should be taken to avoid the 
harm. But the Precautionary Principle admits of stronger and weaker interpretations, and if a 
strong interpretation is too demanding in most policy areas, Catriona McKinnon argues, it 
could nevertheless be defensible with respect to climate change: if the consequences of 
failing to take precautionary action could be such extreme scarcity of resources as to render 
the pursuit of justice itself impossible, then we cannot choose not to be precautionary.70  The 
question then is what kinds of precaution are at issue. 
 The argument that climate change might undermine the very circumstances that make 
justice possible relates to the literature on environmental security.71  The range of views on 
the implications of environmental insecurities for ethical life is extremely wide, but one general 
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insight to have emerged is that, whatever the future may hold in store, the insecurities that 
already afflict people today are amplified by environmental changes.72 For many people in 
many parts of the world, the circumstances that make justice possible have already been 
undermined through processes of ecological marginalization that are permitted and even 
encouraged by the institutions supporting globalization today.   
 It seems not unreasonable to suggest that a pre-requisite of justice for the future is a 
real commitment to justice now.  The implication is that if we are not to discount the future, 
nor to disregard the plight of the worst off today, then the better off have to make greater 
commitments to both equality and reduction of environmental demands.  From this 
perspective, climate ethics is seen as part and parcel of global justice more widely 
construed.73  Those who already suffer most from socio-economic disadvantage globally are 
generally most at risk of having their suffering compounded by the effects of climate change.  
The international institutional order arguably provides structural support for this ‘radical 
inequality’.74 These are institutions in which we – individuals in affluent societies – are all 
implicated, according to some influential theorists of justice, notably Thomas Pogge. But 
Pogge has been challenged on how individuals can be held responsible.75  This question of 
connection between individuals and wider associations and institutions is the final main topic 
area. 
 
Individual obligation and collective action 
Much of the literature on climate ethics addresses what governments or policy makers should 
do.  But what about what each of us ought to do ourselves? Some, like Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, maintain that the problem is primarily political, and should be dealt with at that 
level.76  Jamieson, by contrast, argues that although the nation state is a level of social 
organization relevant to addressing climate change because it is causally efficacious, it is not 
the primary bearer of ethical responsibilities.77  He advocates inculcating green virtues at the 
individual level. Others, like Gardiner78 and Cripps,79 emphasise that the key question is how 
to understand the relationship between individual and collective responsibilities.  This is not 
straightforward, since what one ought to do can sometimes depend on what others do, and 
different individuals can have different views on what should be done, as well as different 
degrees of commitment to actually doing it.  Moreover, to address a problem like climate 
change requires collective action, and how is this to be achieved when individuals and groups 
are motivated by conflicting interests?  Furthermore, even if an individual wants to do the right 
thing, how may their ethical obligations be affected by failure of others to comply with theirs?  
This is the classic kind of collective action problem has a particular salience in climate 
debates.  If some people fail to do their bit, can others be reasonably expected to pick up a 
share of the load that has been left by the defaulters? To expect the morally conscientious to 
take up the slack could be not only unfairly demanding on them, it  could create a perverse 
incentive for others to do even less.80  Hence it could be counterproductive, or even wrong, 
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for one to do what one believes we all ought to do.  As Cripps observes, it remains a major 
philosophical challenge to outline individual climate duties, or to devise suitable rules to apply 
in all circumstances.   
One can therefore appreciate why Jamieson believes we need to inculcate a new, 
greener, ethos.  I have argued something similar in relation to the idea of ‘ecological 
citizenship’, where an ethos of resourceful restraint is contrasted with the expansionist ideals 
immanent in liberal political visions. 81  A focus on the virtues – as a complement to ethics of 
duty, rights or utility, and proposals such as carbon allowances,82 or allowances even against 
a wider range of ecological services83 – would seem to be a necessary factor in thinking 
about what individuals should do.84  It is possible to generate a vision of living a life that is rich 
in ends and simple in means,85 where the focus is on being rather than having,86 where one 
treads more lightly on the planet and shows kindness to one’s fellows, humans and non-.  If 
everyone did this, the problem of climate change might be diffused entirely. 
Obstacles to the fulfilment of this green vision, however, are several. One is that not 
everyone will find it attractive.  Another is that even those who find it attractive are locked into 
more consumerist lifestyles.  Indeed, it is not only a question of what agents want or do: there 
are institutional structures that maintain the incentives and motives for continuing, as far as 
possible, the current development trajectory.  And, not least, different individuals in the world 
today find themselves in some vastly different situations: for some, it is not a case of reining 
in their demands on the planet, but achieving an adequate foothold at all.  A meaningful green 
vision would have to be one that included engagement with the structures of global 
inequality.87   
Climate change presents collective action problems, then, not only for individuals, but 
also for the collectivities that are nation-states.  Moreover, there are other kinds of 
collectivities – notably those of transnational enterprise and finance – that are not presently 
under the control of states.  Given the vital difference it makes to a person’s life whether they 
command some capital, or are employed by capital, or are entirely marginalized by the global 
flows of capital, one would expect a relevant ethics today to attend also to the relationships 
between these classes of individuals as classes.   
 
Conclusion 
Ethics encompasses evaluative thought that extends from noble visions and high ideals to the 
more immediate and constrained assessment of options that face people in the here and 
now.  There are those who advocate forsaking ideal theory altogether in favour of more 
pragmatic policy-making, and ‘realistic’ politics;88 but this risks neglecting how real people – 
and, indeed, history – are moved by ideals.  Visions of a world liberated from indiscriminate 
consumerism among the affluent and destitution among the poor are not at the cutting edge 
of research, but they can help give it orientation.89  
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So it is of course important to engage with policy ideas that are driven by prevailing 
economic interests, including proposals intended to mitigate climate change by developing 
rather than inhibiting economic activity.  Some have a directly physical dimension: for 
instance, geoengineering, ‘the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary 
environment to counteract anthropogenic climage change’,90 is receiving increased attention 
from scientists and policy makers, and it raises major ethical questions that need to be kept 
track of.91  Others have more indirect impacts, as, for instance, the issues surrounding carbon 
trading.92  In such debates it is important to keep alive an active questioning of the ethical 
assumptions made when costings of environmental harms are conducted, or when debating 
energy policy and the cost of various alternative renewable energy sources. 
Security issues, too, are likely to loom larger as the effects of climate change become 
more serious, and I would expect academic collaboration between ethics and environmental 
security to intensify, particularly with regard to issues arising when circumstances of justice 
break down in a region. Questions emerging include whether there should be a distinct 
category of rights for ‘environmental refugees’ or for other endangered communities.93   More 
generally, with the status in international law of environmental rights gradually developing, 
questions remain live about whether – and how – we might think of protection against climate 
change as a human right.  
A question that has not been prominent in climate ethics discussions is what about 
nonhumans? However, as the issues here are somewhat unclear,94 I suspect that concern 
will remain limited to considerations of other species’ role in maintaining our ecological life 
support systems.  
Finally, there are two overarching factors that will continue to require ethical attention.  
The contribution to the problem of the planet’s expanding human population has to a great 
extent been shied away from in academic debates of recent years, but there are signs of a 
renewed attempt to grapple with it.95  The other factor is the similarly inescapable fact that the 
underlying problem of climate change – the cause of continued excess emissions and the 
competitive struggles impeding their abatement  –  is the development trajectory we are on, 
globally.  The ‘treadmill of accumulation’ John Bellamy Foster calls it.96  The most immediate 
and pervasive challenge is to find ways that the well-off can learn to live well but with less 
pressure on the ecological services that support our hitherto commodious climate, while at 
the same time ensuring that the poorer are not precluded from decent life chances. 
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